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The mass media play a prominent role in contemporary international relations. 
Foreign policy success is said to depend not on military or economic power 
alone, but on "whose story wins". Governments therefore construct "strategic 
narratives" to position, legitimize and characterize themselves in international 
affairs. In doing so, they tend to project negative characterizations of their rivals 
and adversaries. There has been less scholarly attention devoted to this "detrac-
tive" dimension of state-led efforts to persuade global audiences than to the 
"attractive" dimension, which is associated with the concept of soft power. 
However, the former has become increasingly salient, particularly in the post-
Soviet region, where acrimonious "information wars" fought between Russia 
and some of its neighbours via the mass media are regular occurrences. This 
article contributes to the emerging literature on strategic narratives in interna-
tional relations through a case study of the Belarusian state media and their re-
porting of Russian social problems. It focuses on the latter half of 2010, a pe-
riod of heightened tension between Moscow and Minsk, when the Belarusian 
leadership was trying to legitimize its actions in the face of harsh criticism from 
the Kremlin. Empirically, the article is based on qualitative analysis of content 
from the leading state-controlled media in Belarus (three TV channels and one 
newspaper), plus interviews with editorial staff from those media outlets. The 
article demonstrates how reporting of Russian social policy in the Belarusian 
state-controlled media was carefully orchestrated to serve particular goals. By 
instructing editors to highlight instances of social neglect in Russia, the Belaru-
sian leadership sought to undermine the public reputation of its critics in Mos-
cow while simultaneously reaffirming close ties with Russia on the basis that 
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bilateral discord was attributable to the Russian elite rather than any rifts with 
the ever "fraternal" Russian people. The research in this article provides a 
timely addition to scholarship that focuses exclusively on the positive-sum com-
munication activities of governments in international relations.
Keywords: Media, strategic narrative, Russia, Belarus
The mass media are today one of the principal arenas of international politics. 
Writing in 2004, Joseph Nye described politics as a "contest of competitive credibil-
ity" (Nye 2004: 106), in which different states and their governments vie with each 
other (and other actors) to frame how mass audiences interpret events. Leaders must 
play out and justify their domestic and foreign policy decisions in front of citizens 
at home and abroad, who increasingly have access to real-time media coverage of 
developments and the diverse commentaries that accompany them. Those who 
outperform their rivals in the contest for credibility can reap rewards such as the 
consolidation of domestic support and reduced international resistance to the pursuit 
of their foreign policy goals. Pride and prestige are at stake too, as a state’s reputation 
and image hinge on how widely its actions are accepted as legitimate.
Nye discusses the mass media within the conceptual framework of "soft 
power" – a kind of power he associates with "eliciting positive attraction" (Nye 
2011: 20). Soft power has become the dominant framework for studying non-coer-
cive influence in international affairs. Many countries now include explicit refer-
ences to soft power among their foreign policy objectives. Yet competition between 
national governments in the sphere of mass communication is often anything but 
soft or benign, because justifying the behaviour of one government frequently 
involves delegitimizing or criticizing the behaviour of another. Persuasion in inter-
national affairs is not just a matter of attraction; it also involves detraction, with 
governments drawing attention to the shortcomings of their rivals or adversaries as 
a means of communicative "self-defence". This can be observed in the so-called 
"information wars" (informatsionnyye voyny) which have accompanied tensions 
between Russia and its neighbours on multiple occasions since 1992.
The deliberately "detractive" side of persuasion in international affairs has 
been relatively neglected in the academic literature. This lacuna is addressed in 
the following pages through analysis of the Belarusian media’s role during a pe-
riod of tension with Russia. In 2010, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko 
and his policies were subjected to strong criticism by Russia’s political leadership 
and the Russian federal media. In response, the Belarusian leadership encouraged 
Belarusian journalists to boost their coverage of Russian social problems and weak-
nesses in Russian social policy. This article argues that such coverage was not 
merely "tit-for-tat" retaliation, but rather, it was part of a strategic narrative (Mis-
kimmon et al. 2013) that reflected and served goals of the Belarusian leadership. 
Reports emphasizing social neglect in Russia were intended to characterize the 
Russian leadership as lacking moral integrity. This, in turn, suggested that Bela-
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rusian citizens need not consider Russia a legitimate source of criticism towards 
Belarus. At the same time, such reports emphasised distance between the critical 
Russian elite and "ordinary" Russian people, with whom Lukashenko has always 
been keen to promote "fraternal" relations.
This article begins with an overview of the literature on governments’ use 
of mass media in pursuit and support of foreign policy objectives. The back-
ground to the 2010 Russian-Belarusian "information war" is then outlined and 
the Belarusian media’s role during that period is examined. Based on analysis 
of Belarusian news bulletins and newspapers and interviews with editorial 
staff, the article demonstrates how Russian social policy and social problems 
were incorporated into the Belarusian strategic narrative with particular goals 
in mind. The article concludes by reflecting on questions raised by the Belaru-
sian case and its implications for future research.
conceptualizing governmental use of mass media 
in foreign affairs
There is almost a century of Western scholarly research about how govern-
ments use mass media in pursuit of their foreign policy aims. Among the earliest 
studies are those dealing with government communication during World War I 
(e. g., Lippman 1922; Lasswell 1927; Ponsonby 1928). This war gave impetus to 
"propaganda analysis" and prompted, in the words of Sproule (1987: 62), a "revo-
lution in thinking about how communication worked in society", as awareness 
spread that depictions of the war were not solely the product of objective informa-
tion and rational argument. Propaganda was understood as "the management of 
collective attitudes" by propagandists wanting to "intensify the attitudes favour-
able to [their] purpose, to reverse the attitudes hostile to it, and to attract the indif-
ferent, or, at the worst, to prevent them from assuming a hostile bent" (Lasswell 
1927: 629). During the 1920s and 1930s, scholars wrote about propaganda from 
a critical perspective to shed light on "the role of institutions in colouring com-
munications given to the public" and to publicize "the problems that modern 
communication posed for democratic life" (Sproule 1989: 226, 229), including, 
although not exclusively, in foreign relations.
Towards the end of the 1930s the paradigm of propaganda analysis began to 
be supplanted by a newer paradigm of "communication research", which focused 
on assessing persuasive effects through statistical-experimental methods instead 
of interrogating the persuader’s intent and techniques from a normative stand-
point. Sproule (1987) attributes the gradual displacement of propaganda analysis 
in the United States to the weakness of its theoretical underpinnings, the prefe- 
rences of funders and rising hostility towards critical analysis of society at a time 
of intensifying external threats. As Graham (2014) argues, World War II and the 
Cold War brought acceptance of the view that even democracies sometimes 
needed to defend their interests through propaganda or something like it. The con-
102
The Journal of Social Policy Studies 14 (1)
cept of propaganda did not disappear (Lee 1952; Kumata, Schramm 1955; Lind-
hal 1983; Herman, Chomsky 1988; Parry-Giles 1994), but in the 1960s a less pejo-
rative term – "public diplomacy" – was devised to describe US efforts to cultivate 
public opinion abroad (Cull 2008; Graham 2014). Public diplomacy was initially 
understood as "direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affect-
ing their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments" (Malone 1985: 199). 
More recent definitions of public diplomacy have made room for the activity of 
non-state actors and two-way communication between the "sending" state and 
"receiving" public (Gilboa 2008). Whereas the concept of propaganda had been 
closely associated with distortion or obfuscation of the truth, public diplomacy 
suggests a more honest, positive-sum approach.
In the post-Cold-War period, public diplomacy (Melissen 2005; Entman 2008; 
Sheafer, Gabay 2009) and the related concept of "soft power" (Nye 1990; 2004) 
have become pillars of the dominant framework for studying governments’ at-
tempts to utilize the mass media in the realm of international relations. There is 
a substantial body of literature addressing the soft power and public diplomacy 
efforts of both Western and non-Western countries, in which the media (particu-
larly international broadcasters) feature strongly. However, it is problematic to 
view the instrumentalization of the media for foreign policy purposes exclu-
sively through the prism of public diplomacy and soft power. Even leaving aside 
the theoretical inconsistencies in Nye’s writing (see Mattern 2005; Lock 2010; 
Szostek 2014), this framework is inadequate for studying certain aspects of pub-
lic persuasion in international affairs.
One weakness of the soft power/public diplomacy framework is its tendency 
to discuss governments’ (self-)promotional activities without paying sufficient at-
tention to the fact that deprecation of others can be an equally salient and a necessary 
corollary. For example, international promotion of secular democracy via the media 
or educational material inevitably goes hand in hand with implicit or explicit criti-
cism of authoritarian leaders, their supporters, and certain religious worldviews. As 
Price notes, so-called soft power approaches can be "surprisingly aggressive" and 
perceived as a "hostile, debilitating intrusion" among the elites and wider societies 
of target states (Price 2015: loc. 3331). Price examines the case of Iran, where tools 
that Western policy-makers describe as soft are perceived by Iranian elites as malign 
tools of disintegration. Whether or not such perceptions are accurate, they matter 
"because of the nature of counter-strategies that are triggered and angers that are 
fostered" (Price 2015: loc. 3673).
Another weakness of the soft power/public diplomacy framework is the overly 
sharp division it imposes between domestic and international media audiences. Al-
though policies and practices labelled as "public diplomacy" and "soft power" are 
indeed aimed at publics abroad, modern communication cannot be contained within 
national borders. Governments must interact with domestic and foreign journalists 
simultaneously; the messages they deliver locally will be reported internationally and 
vice versa. The soft power/public diplomacy framework seems excessively rooted in 
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medium rather than message, even though persuasive success may depend as much 
on the latter as the former. The work of Entman (2004) makes clear that all kinds of 
mass media – not just purpose-built international broadcasters – are affected by 
governmental efforts to get their preferred messages across in international affairs. 
He observes that the White House and other parts of the U.S. elite engage in "strate-
gic manipulation" (including word choice, timing and the distribution and withhold-
ing of information) to frame news events, with their choices based on calculations of 
potential domestic political advantages and international diplomatic benefits and risks 
(Entman 2004: 91). An analytical approach that separates the international and do-
mestic dimensions therefore makes little sense. Elsewhere, research by Entman (1991) 
and Baysha and Calabrese (2011) demonstrates how heavy reliance on elite sources 
and the constraints of cognitive habit have, on occasion, led the U.S. media to adopt 
and reinforce news frames propagated by U.S. governments which portray foreign 
"others" in a very negative light.
A conceptual innovation which overcomes the weaknesses of soft power 
is the idea of "strategic narrative" proposed by Miskimmon et al. (2013). Stra-
tegic narrative is defined as
a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present 
and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and inter-
national actors <…>. They are narratives about both states and the system itself, 
both about who we are and what kind of order we want (Miskimmon et al.: 2).
Governments project narratives which frame their own character as well 
as the character of others and understandings of the international system. The 
narratives are "strategic" when they are formulated to serve particular goals, 
such as legitimation, diversion of attention, raising popularity or mobilization 
of support. The strategic narrative framework neither assumes nor implies that 
communication in international affairs is soft, diplomatic or otherwise benign; 
it allows for the reality of contestation. It makes no attempt to artificially com-
partmentalize foreign and domestic audiences, although it does recognise that 
the impact of any strategic narrative will depend partly on the media ecology 
and cultural context inhabited by those on the "receiving" end.
The framework of strategic narrative is therefore well suited to study the 
phenomenon of post-Soviet "information wars", which entail persuasive efforts 
that are very much adversarial and transnational. The following sections consider 
an episode when the Russian and Belarusian narratives were deeply at odds: the 
"information war" that erupted between Moscow and Minsk in 2010.
the 2010 "information war": context and origins
Ever since Aleksandr Lukashenko became Belarusian president in 1994, 
Belarus has been among Russia’s most enthusiastic partners. Official backing 
for a close union with Russia extends to the media sector. In 2008 Belarusian 
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Minister of Information Vladimir Rusakevich said that creating a "single infor-
mation space" with Russia was an important strategic objective for both sides 
(Embassy of Belarus in the Russian Federation 2008). The authorities in Minsk 
facilitate Russian involvement in their country’s media environment in some re-
spects. For example, three of the main state-owned TV channels in Belarus (ONT, 
RTR-Belarus, NTV-Belarus) base their line-ups wholly or substantially on shows 
from Russia. Belarusian editions of Russian tabloids (Komsomolskaya Pravda 
v Belorussii, Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii) are widely available and popular. 
The Union State of Russia and Belarus has media of its own, including the TV 
channel TRO Soyuza and newspaper supplement Soyuz. Yet official endorsement 
of the single information space is offset by Lukashenko’s policy of controlling 
the Belarusian media environment to prevent criticism of himself and his admin-
istration. Although Russian participation in the Belarusian media market is al-
lowed and even encouraged, there are mechanisms in place to restrict what 
Russian-owned media can say. For instance, Belarusian cable networks are not 
allowed to carry the standard international versions of Russia’s main channels 
(Pervyy Kanal Vsemirnaya set, RTR-Planeta, NTV–Mir). Instead, programmes 
from these channels are primarily viewed in Belarus as rebroadcasts on channels 
controlled by the Belarusian state. This makes it easier for the authorities in Minsk 
to cut out, prior to broadcast, content they would prefer Belarusian citizens not 
to see. Meanwhile, journalists and editors at the Russian-owned tabloid newspa-
pers work in the knowledge that their publications could risk closure if their 
content were considered hostile to the Belarusian president. This motivates them 
to steer clear of any kind of controversy.
Such technical and legal mechanisms offer Belarus a degree of protection 
against inflows of critical Russian media coverage during periods of bilateral tension. 
Nevertheless, there is an overlap between the Belarusian and Russian media environ-
ments and any criticism of Belarus in the Russian media does still resonate strong-
ly within Belarus. The Belarusian authorities can censor Russian content from the 
main state-controlled channels but they cannot easily stop their citizens accessing 
Russian content via the internet or satellite broadcasts. Post-Soviet borders are very 
porous when it comes to Russian-language information. This situation somewhat 
resembles a communal apartment with thin walls: whenever Russia talks about its 
neighbours it tends to be overheard and the neighbours inevitably react – sometimes 
trying to block off the noise next door, sometimes shouting back. These are the 
conditions in which so-called "information wars" have erupted, when negative Rus-
sian media coverage of neighbouring states has been interpreted as "attacks" on 
those countries (even when the primary target audience was probably the domestic 
Russian one). "Information war" has been a major theme of the ongoing crisis in 
Ukraine, but it is not a new phenomenon.
The roots of the tensions between Moscow and Minsk in 2010 were primar-
ily economic (Szostek 2015). Russia had begun to insist that Belarus pay the full 
export duty on any Russian oil that it refined and sold to other countries. This 
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threatened an important revenue source of the Belarusian government. Belarus 
complained that Russia’s demands contravened the spirit of the new Customs 
Union (which was due to be launched on 1 July) and the Belarusian president 
threatened not to proceed with Customs Union agreements unless the duties on 
oil were abolished (Belapan 2010). Subsequently, a dispute broke out over gas 
supplies, with Russian state company Gazprom subsequently reducing its deliv-
eries to Belarus due to "unpaid debts". President Lukashenko perceived this as 
blackmail aimed at securing his signature on Customs Union agreements, and 
vocally condemned Moscow’s "unfriendly" approach (Yezhednevnik 2010).
In the context of these disputes and some personal antipathy, the "informa-
tion war" escalated to a new level when Russian channel NTV began broadcasting 
a four-part series of documentaries, Krestnyy Batka ("Godfather Lukashenko"). 
The documentaries, which went out on 4 July, 16 July, 15 August and 8 October 
2010, portrayed Lukashenko as a despot and accused him of complicity in the 
disappearance of his opponents. Another major "information strike" from Mos-
cow came on 3 October, when President Dmitriy Medvedev devoted a highly 
critical video blog to the subject of Belarus, accusing Lukashenko of breaking 
"elementary rules of behaviour" (BBC 2010).
The Krestnyy Batka series and Russian news reports about Medvedev’s video 
blog were censored from the TV channels rebroadcasting Russian programmes in 
Belarus. However, large numbers of Belarusians still managed to view them, most 
likely via the internet, satellite or in recorded form. One survey found that around 
40 per cent of Belarusians had watched one or more of the Krestnyy Batka documen-
taries by October 2010 (IISEPS 2010). In this situation it would have been difficult 
for the Belarusian president and his administration to ignore or hush up what the 
Russian media were saying. Instead, they responded with their own narratives about 
the bilateral tensions, aimed at neutralizing the impact of the Russian messages.
the Belarusian narrative of russia during the "information war"
To demonstrate how the Belarusian leadership used narrative strategically in 
its attempt to counteract the potential impact of Russian criticism, this section pre-
sents analysis of content samples from three TV news bulletins and one newspaper, 
all owned and controlled by structures of the Belarusian state. The news bulletins 
are Panorama, which is broadcast nightly by Belarusian state channel Belarus 1; 
Nashi Novosti, which is the flagship evening bulletin on state channel ONT; and 24 
Chasa, which is shown on STV, originally the channel of the Minsk municipal au-
thorities. The newspaper is Sovetskaya Belorussiya, also known as Belarus Segodnya, 
which is the official organ of the Belarusian presidential administration and one of 
the most widely-circulated publications in Belarus.
The content sample is drawn from a sampling population of 11 consecutive 
weeks from 23 August to 5 November 2010. The sample comprises all bulletins and 
issues from the weeks (excluding weekends) beginning 23 August, 6 September, 
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20 September, 4 October and 1 November 2010. The timing of this sample was 
dictated by the start date of the doctoral research on which this study is based (a sam-
ple period had to be arranged in advance rather chosen retrospectively, because the 
required content is not available in archives). Alternative weeks were sampled as a 
way to cover a broader time period while keeping the amount of content to be ana-
lysed feasible. The TV news bulletins were recorded to DVDs and newspapers were 
collected in their paper versions. Analysis was conducted qualitatively, by the author, 
to identify recurring patterns and trace how Russian social policy and social prob-
lems featured within the state’s narrative.
The following narrative plotlines could be observed across all the news 
providers during the period under study: (1) The Russian leadership neglects the 
social needs of ordinary Russians, who admire/envy Belarus and her superior 
social conditions; (2) Russia’s media attacks on Belarus are backfiring as ordinary 
Russians disagree with their leaders; (3) ordinary Russians and Belarusians are 
continuing to work together – they have always been fraternal peoples and there 
can be no quarrel between them.
The first plotline was conveyed emotively by Belarusian correspondents 
reporting on "ordinary people’s problems in Russia. One example was a report 
by Nashi Novosti correspondent Svetlana Karulskaya on 10 September. Karul-
skaya described how a small group of villagers from Russia’s Kabarda-Balkar 
Republic had been on hunger strike outside the Kremlin for several months, 
„awaiting a response from the Russian leadership to their request to support 
their right to land“ (Nashi Novosti 2010a). In her account, she explained that 
the local authorities were taking the villagers" land away and giving it to oli-
garchs. She told viewers:
It appears nobody notices the elders, although they are passed every day by 
journalists of the federal channels filming the work of the State Duma and 
Kremlin protocol. So far only ordinary people are responding. (Nashi Nov-
osti 2010a)
The above quotation clearly distinguishes between caring "ordinary" Rus-
sians on one hand and uncaring Russian journalists and politicians on the other. 
Such reporting serves the Belarusian leadership’s goal of discrediting Russian 
journalists and politicians as sources of criticism, while preserving a close rela-
tionship between the two countries and their "fraternal" peoples.
Allegations of the Russian leadership’s neglect of its people featured again in 
a Nashi Novosti report on 3 November, when the bulletin informed viewers about 
the Russian Finance Ministry’s intention to raise the retirement age. A correspond-
ent in Moscow told viewers:
Russians have started saying they are being invited to die at work <…> Pen-
sions have remained at the level of one subsistence minimum instead of the 
promised three; the increase in the single social tax has brought nothing; the 
savings programme is not working. (Nashi Novosti 2010b)
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Such a report again serves to discredit the Russian state and its policies, 
aiming to persuade Belarusian viewers that Russian criticisms of Belarus do 
not merit attention.
Nashi Novosti was not alone in highlighting the suffering of the Russian peo-
ple at the hands of an incompetent and corrupt state; Panorama did likewise. On 
23 September Panorama ran a report on the poor harvest in Russia and subsequent 
food price inflation, in which the correspondent asserted that people were still 
awaiting a "more or less coherent" policy response from the Kremlin (Panorama 
2010a). Then on 6 October Panorama announced:
The Russian government intends to economize on social projects. This con-
cerns the ill, children, and pregnant women<…> The Russian government 
is counting on saving over 48 billion roubles at the expense of pregnant and 
ill people. (Panorama 2010b)
Often, poor social conditions in Russia were contrasted against a much better 
situation in Belarus. On 24 August, for instance, 24 Chasa reported that more and 
more Russian citizens were moving to settle in Belarus. The presenter claimed that 
it was easy to explain their actions, because Belarus was "more stable" and all 
conditions had been created "for a calm and peaceful life." In the report, individu-
als who had moved from Russia to Belarus were shown saying: "[i]n Russia 
people have to rely only on themselves<…> there is no question of the state help-
ing" (24 Chasa 2010).
The plotline of Russian media attacks "backfiring" was conveyed in multiple 
reports emphasising the difference in opinion between Russia’s ordinary people and 
its elite. For example, both Panorama on 22 September and Nashi Novosti on 24 
September told viewers that the Belarusian Presidential Administration had been 
receiving "floods" of letters from Russian citizens in support of Lukashenko, despite 
the critical allegations made in the Russian state media. Examples of such letters 
were displayed on screen. One, from "a resident of Moscow Region", read:
Now we can say for sure that the Russian elites are motivated not only by hate, 
but by fear above all. A person with accurate information about the state of 
affairs in Belarus can compare his life with the life of his Slavic neighbours; 
this is what our authorities fear. (Panorama 2010c)
Much the same message was conveyed by Nashi Novosti. On 24 September 
it shared with viewers the words of an "Afghan war veteran from Russia", who 
was reported saying:
I have formed a wonderful impression of the Belarusian state, about its people 
and its successes <…> I wish people were treated the same way in our state, here 
in Russia, that the state flourished in the same way… (Nashi Novosti 2010c)
The day after Medvedev criticized Lukashenko in his video blog, Nashi 
Novosti continued to emphasise that the discord between Russia and Belarus was 
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limited to the elite level. It showed a clip of Belarusian MP Gennadiy Davydko 
on 4 October, saying:
All these fights take place at the level of the highest echelon, not at the level 
of ordinary people. After all, oil and gas in Russia belong to the oligarchs, 
not the Russian people. (Nashi Novosti 2010d)
This plotline reflects the Belarusian leadership’s desire to limit the long-
term damage of its fall-out with the Kremlin. Maintaining a close relationship 
with Russia is a central objective of Belarusian foreign policy, given the Bela-
rusian economy’s high level of dependence on Russia. Therefore, a narrative 
was constructed to suggest that the bilateral disputes had shallow roots.
Reports about Russia in the newspaper Sovetskaya Belarussiya were on the 
whole less emotive and prominent than the television reports. Nevertheless, Russian 
social problems were highlighted regularly. For example, on 22 September the paper 
reprinted an article from Poland’s Gazeta Wyborcza titled "Baghdad on Prospekt 
Mira", which described rubbish lying around on Moscow streets and the impossibi- 
lity of buying good meat because of a public health official "who, on orders from 
above, can find harmful substances in any goods imported from countries that have 
fallen out of grace with the Kremlin" (Radziwinowicz 2010: 5). The same day, an-
other article was reprinted from Russian website gazeta.ru. Prompted by the with-
drawal from circulation of Russian one-kopeck coins, it described the kopeck’s de-
mise as the "sad metaphorical result of the Putin decade" which had been character-
ised by rising prices. "Such is Russian political life: as senseless as a kopeck and as 
merciless as double-digit inflation," it concluded (Kolesnikov 2010: 5).
Sovetskaya Belorussiya relied extensively on foreign and particularly Russian 
sources when reporting on shortcomings in Russia’s social policy. It has a column 
called Daydzhest (Digest) which provides a daily selection of material from Russian 
newspapers and websites. Topics which came up in this column during the period 
under study included the Russian authorities’ failure to provide war veterans with 
housing; the deficit of buckwheat in Russia; high food prices (mentioned repeat-
edly); Russia’s demographic decline; high levels of corruption; high levels of ine-
quality; and terrorism. These small reports did not go so far as the TV bulletins in 
explicit criticism of the Russian government, but they fitted neatly into the overall 
characterization of the Russian leadership as neglectful, removed from and indif-
ferent to its own populace – and thus lacking the right or justification to criticize 
the (implicitly better) situation in neighbouring Belarus.
coordinating the narrative
Interviews with representatives of the Belarusian media provide an insight into 
how the state’s narrative was coordinated during the "information war". The inter-
views were conducted by the author in Minsk during October 2012 and are presented 
here in anonymous form. All the cited interviews were conducted with current or 
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former employees of the news providers included in the content analysis (i. e. Belarus 
1, ONT, STV and Sovetskaya Belorussiya). Most interviewees were recruited by cold-
calls to editorial/press offices (i. e. formal interview requests), although personal 
contacts were also utilized. All the interviewees occupied or had previously occupied 
quite senior positions in their respective news organizations.
None of the interviewees made any claim to impartiality in reporting of 
Russian-Belarusian relations. As employees of state-controlled media, each con-
sidered it their duty to support their country and its leadership. A Panorama jour-
nalist stated, "Of course we have to defend the interests of the state", while an edi-
tor at ONT said Nashi Novosti’s task was to "display the arguments of the Belarusian 
side" during periods of conflict in Russian-Belarusian relations. Similarly, a senior 
representative at STV observed: "In such situations [information wars] it’s probably 
a matter of honour to stand up for oneself, right?"
Journalists and editors working for the Belarusian state media follow instruc-
tions issued by the Presidential Administration. A Panorama journalist explained:
It happens at the level of the Presidential Administration, of course, certain 
aspects are conveyed to us, which it would be desirable to report. And of 
course, we take them into account in our work.
A clear chain of command exists, by which officials instruct editors and 
the editors in turn control the work of their journalists. One interviewee with 
experience working at Sovetskaya Belorussiya described how this process 
begins with weekly meetings at the Presidential Administration:
Usually the editor-in-chief goes there, or his first deputy. These meetings 
take place every Monday. And afterwards, each Monday, it becomes more 
or less clear what the tone of reporting about Russian-Belarusian relations 
is going to be.
Instructions received from the Presidential Administration include responding 
"appropriately" to any criticism from Moscow. As the interviewee from Nashi 
Novosti put it:
In line with the recommendations of our leadership, it is necessary to re-
spond to any "made to order" [Russian] report or whatever you want to call 
it, let it be on their conscience… We have to react to their report.
During the "information war" period, the expected response was to dis-
credit those sources from which criticism of the Belarusian president was 
emanating – the Russian leadership and federal media. An interviewee recalled 
the approach adopted at Sovetskaya Belorussiya:
I remember that the top management proposed that we should not hold back 
<…> That is, we could be forthright in expressing things. It was a period 
when tasks were even set to write more aggressively [napisat pozhestche]. 
Irony, sarcasm, a touch of scandal – it was all OK.
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The same interviewee continued by describing the aim of their endeavours:
It was all necessary to demonstrate that those films [the Krestnyy Batka series] 
were a lie. In order to expose the mendacity of the Russian government and the 
Russian authorities, any topic could be used – culture, sport, whatever.
The interviews strongly suggested that the substantial coverage devoted to 
Russian social policy and problems during 2010 was unusual and would not have 
occurred without the bilateral tensions. During calmer periods Belarusian news 
bulletins prefer to focus on stories about Belarus, since viewers can watch rebroad-
casts of Russian news bulletins to follow developments in Russia. The ONT inter-
viewee said: "If they are purely domestic Russian problems we leave it to the con-
science of Pervyy Kanal", while the Panorama journalist stated:
Of course, our viewers can get the fullest picture of Russia directly from the 
Russian news <…> So if certain events happen in Russia, purely Russian 
domestic matters, in principle we don’t pay much attention to it unless it’s 
something big, for example a terrorist attack or an explosion.
There can thus be little doubt that the prominence of Russian social prob-
lems in the Belarusian media during 2010 had a strategic purpose: it was in-
tended to shape audience reactions to the fallout with the Kremlin rather than 
to meet any public need or desire for information on the topic.
conclusion
Reporting of Russian social policy and social problems in the Belarusian media 
during 2010 is a clear example of how the leadership of one country may actively 
deprecate the leadership of another for strategic purposes. The Belarusian presi-
dential administration projected a strategic narrative that was oriented towards re-
suming "fraternal", economically beneficial relations with Russia, as well as the 
preservation of Lukashenko’s firm grip on domestic power. This study of Belarus 
provides a useful corrective to the focus of recent scholarship about the way govern-
ments deploy mass media in international relations, which has tended to emphasize 
positive-sum communication activities.
Belarus is far from being the only state to incorporate "detraction" as well as 
"attraction" into its approach to the mass media as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Belarusian efforts to discredit the critical Russian elite were particularly overt and 
orchestrated, but in fact any government that engages in persuasion in interna-
tional affairs is likely to deprecate its rivals to some degree. Future studies of 
strategic narrative might explore how democratic governments formulate and project 
negative characterizations of other international actors, in conditions where the 
media enjoy a higher level of independence from the state. Questions of reception 
and response also require investigation. A strategic narrative that incorporates 
negative characterizations may prompt a range of different reactions – from scep-
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ticism, anger and counter-narratives to credence and support. One goal of future 
research would be to explain this variation and consider its implications for the way 
persuasion operates in international affairs.
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